International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2006

Price: $125.00 600 pages. 1 Hardcover Volume. Published April 2007
ISBN-13: 978-1-57823-223-9 / ISBN-10: 1-57823-223-6

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Book Overview

Chapter 1 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS: THE U.S. MODEL
by Thomas O. Barnett

I. Introduction
II. The U.S. Experience in Cartel Enforcement
III. The Mutual Benefits of Vigorous Cartel Enforcement in Other Jurisdictions
IV. Conclusion

Chapter 2 THE FIGHT AGAINST CARTELS: IS A ‘MIXED’ APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT THE ANSWER?
by John Fingleton, Marie-Barbe Girard and Simon Williams

I. Introduction
II. Cartels Involve Substantial Theft and Economic Harm
III. How Can We Best Detect Cartels?
IV. Civil Enforcement: Is It Sufficient
V. Criminal Enforcement
VI. Director Disqualification Powers: An Interesting "Third Way"
VII. A few Lessons from the Irish and United Kingdom Experiences
VIII. Conclusion

Chapter 3 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS – PROBLEMS WITH THE U.S. MODEL
by Leslie W. Jacobs

I. The Spectrum of Concerted Action
II. The Different Perceptions of Enforcers and Jurors
III. The Trial Statistics
IV. The Application of the "Conspiracy" Prejudice
V. Government Enforcement Abuses
   A. Amnesty
   B. Investigative Techniques
   C. Negotiating Demands
   D. Charging Recommendations
   E. Sentencing Positions
VI. Duplicative Penalties
VII. Extradition
VIII. Conclusion 

Chapter 4 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS
by Claes Norgren

I. Fighting Cartels
II. Conditions for Efficiency in a Dual System
   A. Proportional Sanctions
   B. Deterrence
   C. The Interaction with the Leniency System
III. Other Measures to Make Administrative Systems Work
IV. Conclusion

Chapter 5 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS  - THE U.S. MODEL - A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE
by Sheridan Scott

I. Introduction
II. Brief History of Canadian Competition Law
   A. Evolution of the Canadian Criminal Provisions
   B. Limitations of the Criminal Regime for Mergers and Monopolies
   C. The Need for Reform
III. Deterrence as the Basis for Enforcement
IV. Enforcement Principles and Practicalities in Canada
V. Sanctions
   A. Fines
   B. Private Actions
   C. Individual Liability- Incarceration and Imprisonment
VI. Probability of Detection
   A. Immunity Programs
   B. International Cooperation
   C. Increase Resources to Enforcement Agencies
VII. Prevention and Education
   A. Educating the Judiciary
   B. Educating Businesses and Individuals
   C. Sentencing Guidelines
VIII. Conclusion 

Chapter 6 PREVENTING AND SANCTIONING ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT: EFFECTIVE USE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, LENIENCY PROGRAMMES AND PRIVATE ACTION IN THE EU
by Philip Lowe

I. Sanctions in the EU - Overview
II. Sanctions on Undertakings
   A. The Commission's Case Practice and Policy
   B. Fines on Undertakings by Competition Authorities of the Member States
III. Sanctions on Individuals
   A. Sanctions on Individuals in Member States' Laws
   B. Sanctions on Individuals in their Context
   C. Criminal Sanctions on Individuals at EC Institutional Level?
IV. Cooperation in the ECN under Regulation N1/2003
   A. Applicability of Regulation N1/2003
   B. Exchange of Information and Assistance
V. Interplay with Leniency Programmes
   A. Corporate Leniency  
   B. Leniency for Individuals
VI. Private Enforcement - A Complement to Public Enforcement
VII. Conclusion 

Chapter 7 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS—ROUNDTABLE

A. Paul Victor
Thomas O. Barnett
John Fingleton
Leslie W. Jacobs
Philip Lowe
Claes Norgren
Sheridan Scott

Panel Discussion

Chapter 8 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION ― DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS VICTIMS AND USERS
by Eleanor M. Fox and Dennis Davis

I. Introduction
II. Industrial Policy of Developed Countries that Tends to Harm Developing Countries
III. China, Competition and Industrial Policy
   A. The Vitamins Case
   B. China's Internal Market Industrial Policy
   C. Mergers and Industrial Policy
IV. South Africa, Competition and Industrial Policy
V. World Antitrust and Industrial Policy in Mexico
VI. A Glimpse at U.S. Antitrust Law and Industrial Policy
VII. Recommendations and Conclusions

Chapter 9 TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A UNIFIED TRANS-ATLANTIC DEFENSE PROCUREMENT MARKET
by William E. Kovacic

I. Introduction
II. Trans-Atlantic Arms Trade: Historical Patterns and Obstacles
III. Motivations to Increase European and U.S. Defense Industrial Integration
   A. Preserving the Benefits of Competition
   B. Expanding Funding Sources for New Weapons Programs
   C. Political Pressure for Integration
IV. Paths to Greater Trans-Atlantic Defense Industry Integration
   A. Industrial Integration by Contract and Merger
   B. Multinational Weapons Programs
   C. Combined Military Operations
   D. Military/Civil Industrial Integration
V. A Policy Framework for Increasing Trans-Atlantic Defense Industry Integration
VI. Conclusion

Chapter 10 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
by Neelie Kroes

Chapter 11 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN MEXICO
by Eduardo Pérez Motta

I. Introduction
II. Mexico's Industrial Policy: General Overview
   A. Overview
   B. The CFC's Role in Industrial Policy
III. Regulatory Challenges
   A. First Generation: Lowering the Costs of Doing Business
   B. Second Generation: Improving Efficiency in Regulated Sectors
IV. Solutions for Improving Regulation
   A. Creation of Regulatory Bodies
   B. Solutions for Regulation in Mexico
V. Other Challenges   

Chapter 12 INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY—ROUNDTABLE

Ferdinand Hermanns
Eleanor M. Fox
William Kovacic
Philip Lowe
Eduardo Pérez Motta
Christian Stoffaës

Panel Discussion

Chapter 13 COORDINATED EFFECTS IN MERGER REVIEW: QUANTIFYING THE PAYOFFS FROM COLLUSION
by William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx, Steven P. Schulenberg

I. Introduction
II. The Proposed Analysis and the Guidelines
III. Applications
   A. Differentiated Products Price Competition
   B. Airtours
   C. Bidder Competition at Procurements
IV. Conclusion

Chapter 15 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE PROBLEM OF PROLIFERATION
by J. William Rowley QC and Omar K. Wakil

I. Introduction
II. The Problem of Proliferation
   A. Inappropriate Merger Notification Threshold Test
   B. Opaque Triggering Events
   C. Early Filing Deadlines
   D. Burdensome Filing Requirements
   E. Unsolicited Bids
   F. The Costs of Multi-jurisdictional Deals
III. Substantive Convergence and the Issue of Efficiency
IV. Sleeping Giants?
V. International Competition Network and Merger Streamlining
   A. The Merger Streamlining Group
   B. International Competition Network
   C. The MSG's Work Plan
VI. Conclusion 

Chapter 16 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: MERGER IN SMALL ECONOMIES
by Walter A. Stoffel

I. Problems and Notions
   A. Small Economies
   B. Domestic and International Mergers
II. The Substantive Test
   A. In General
   B. The Practice
III. Mechanisms of Merger Control
   A. Criteria and Modes of Intervention
   B. The Swiss Solution and its Effects
IV. Conclusions

Chapter 17 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS—ROUNDTABLE

Michael D. Blechman
Robert Pitofsky
Walter Stoffel
Robert C. Marshall
J. William Rowley
Randolph W. Tritell 

Panel Discussion

Chapter 18 SIGNPOSTS OF ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSION: RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
by Herbert Hovenkamp

I. Introduction
II. Restraints on Innovation
III. Exclusionary Practices and Returns to Scale
IV. Specific Exclusionary Practices
   A. Refusal to Deal
   B. Pricing Practices I - Traditional Predation
   C. "Sustainable" Pricing Strategies
   D. Business Torts
V. Conclusion

Chapter 19 DEFINING EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2: THE CASE FOR NON-UNIVERSAL STANDARDS
by Marina Lao

I. Introduction
II. A Single Standard Would Necessarily Overdeter Innocent Conduct or Underdeter Exclusionary Conduct
III. Profit Sacrifice/No Economic Sense and "Equally Efficient Competitor" Tests as Universal Tests: Risk of Underdeterence
   A. The Profit Sacrifice/No Economic Sense Test - The Main Difference Between "Sacrifice" and "No Economic Sense"
   B. Strengths and Weaknesses: Practically Eliminates False Positives, but Prone to False Negatives
   C. Application: Satisfactory for Some Conduct but Not For Others
   D. The "Excluding Equally Efficient Competitor" Test
IV. The Consumer Welfare Effects Test
   A. "Disproportionality" and "Balancing" and Burden-Shifting
V. A Proposed Non-Universal Approach
   A. Ordering the Recognized Categories of Exclusionary Conduct in Terms of Factors Bearing on the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
   B. Retaining the Basic Form of the Predatory Pricing Rule
   C. Other Categories: Using Presumptions and Other Adjustments on a Rule of Reason Framework
   D. Prima Facie Showing
   E. After Prima Facie Showing: Socially Useless Conduct Conclusively Deemed Exclusionary
   F. After Prima Facie Showing: Justification, No Less Exclusionary Alternative and Balancing Effects
   G. Grouping Other Allegedly Exclusionary Practices
VI. Possible Objections
   A. Incoherence, Excess Focus on Categorizing Conduct, and Insufficient Focus on Economic Effects
   B. The Impracticality of Classifying All Possible Exclusionary Conduct
   C. Creates Uncertainty and Provides Insufficient Guidance for Business
VII. Conclusion


Chapter 20 THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN ARTICLE 82 CASES
by Emil Paulis

Chapter 21 THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE PROPER ANTITRUST STANDARD FOR ANTICOMPETITIVE EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
by Steven C. Salop

I. Introduction
II. Competing Paradigms of Exclusionary Conduct: Predatory Pricing and Raising Rivals' Costs
III. Alternative Standards
   A. Equally Efficient Competitor Standard
   B. Sacrifice Standard
   C. Consumer Welfare Effect Standard
   D. Per Se Legality Standard
IV. Evaluating the Standards
   A. False Negatives and the Equally Efficient Competitor Standard
   B. False Negative and False Positives with the Sacrifice Standard
   C. Comparing the Defendant's Information Burdens
V. Refusals to Supply
   A. Sacrifice Standard
   B. Equally Efficient Competitor Standard
   C. Consumer Welfare Effect Standard
   D. Per Se Legality Standard and the Trinko Case
   E. DG Comp Discussion Paper
VI. Conclusion
Appendix

Chapter 22 IDENTIFYING SINGLE-FIRM EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT: FROM VAGUE CONCEPTS TO ADMINISTRABLE RULES
by Gregory J. Werden

I. Introduction
II. The Basic Legal Concepts for Section 2 and Article 82
   A. The Concepts of Monopoly Power and Dominance
   B. The Concept of Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct
   C. The Challenge of Identifying Anticompetitive Exclusionary Conduct
III. Appropriately Limiting the Domain of Section 2a Article 82
   A. A Rigorous Dominance Screen
   B. Safe Harbors for Certain Categories of Conduct
IV. The No Economic Sense Test
   A. The No Economic Sense Test and its Rationale
   B. The No Economic Sense Test in the Light of Controlling Case Law
   C. Administrability of the No Economic Sense Test
V. The Consumer Welfare Test
   A. The Consumer Welfare Test and its Rationale
   B. The Consumer Welfare Test in the Light of Controlling Case Law
   C.  Administrability of the Consumer Welfare Test
VI. Conclusion

Chapter 23 GENERAL APPROACHES TO DEFINING ABUSIVE/MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES — ROUNDTABLE

A. Douglas Melamed
Herbert Hovenkamp
Prof. Marina Lao
Emil Paulis
Steven C. Salop
Gregory J. Werden

Panel Discussion

Book Overview