Assessing the Reasonableness of the Rule of Reason: The World After Leegin - Chapter 23 - International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2009

Full Table of Contents from "International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2009"

Foreword
Summary Table of Contents
Table of Contents
 

Chapter 1

Oligopolistic Market Power -- An Israeli Perspective 

by Ronit Kan and Ilan Steiner

I.        Introduction

II.      The Market Power Triangle

III.     Revision of Concentration Group Provisions in Israel's Restrictive Trade Practices Act (RTPA)

          A.      Oligopolies in the Context of a Small Island Economy
          B.      Overview of the Proposed Revision
          C.      Comments on the Proposed Revision

IV.     Conclusion

 

Chapter 2

Striving for the Optimal Balance in Antitrust Enforcement: Single-Firm Conduct, Antitrust Remedies and Procedural Fairness 

by Christine A. Varney

I.        Introduction:  The Legacy of The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee

II.      In Search of Greater Convergence in Global Antitrust Enforcement Standards

          A.      Single-Firm Conduct
          B.      Antitrust Remedies -- Fines

III.     Conclusion:  Towards Greater Transparency and Procedural Fairness

 

Chapter 3

International Antitrust: Recent Developments and Trends 

A. Paul Victor, Moderator

Bernhard Heitzer

Ronit Kan

Jon Leibowitz

Philip Lowe

Graeme Samuel

Philip J. Weiser


Panel Discussion

 

Chapter 4

Antitrust and State Aid Control -- The Lessons Learned 

by Neelie Kroes

I.        Antitrust Progress

II.      The Value of State Aid Control

III.     How Does The System Work?

IV.     The Car Industry

V.      Is The System Working?



Chapter 5

State Aids and EU Competition Law and Policy -- Q & A 

by Neelie Kroes

Q&A

 

Chapter 6

European State Aid Policy in Search of a Standard. What is the Role of Economic Analysis? 

by Alberto Heimler

I.        Introduction

II.      The EC Policy on State Aid, The Optimal Institutional - Setting and The New Economic Approach

          A.      State aid policy and the quality of regulation
          B.      Article 87, paragraph 1, and distortions of competition
          C.      The exemption of incompatible State aid
          D.      The new economic approach in State aid policy

III.     Restructuring Aid and the Alitalia Case

IV.     Locational Aid and the Charleroi Case

V.      The Recovery of Unlawful State Aid and the Italian Digital Decoder Case

VI.     Conclusion

 

Chapter 7

EU and UK Competition Laws and the Financial Crisis. The Price of Avoiding Systemic Failure 

by Simon Polito

I.       Introduction

II.      EU State Aid Regime and The Financial Crisis
         
          A.      An Overview of the EU Regime
          B.      Pre-October 2008
          C.      Post October 2008

III.     UK Merger Control and The Financial Crisis

          A.      An Overview of the UK Regime
          B.      Development of the Crisis in the UK Banking Sector
          C.      Regulatory Decisions Affecting The UK Banking Sector
          D.      Banking Sector Reform

IV.     Conclusions and Reflections

          A.      Commission
          B.      UK Authorities

 

Chapter 8

Government Aid, Antitrust Enforcement and Competition in a Distressed Economy 

by James F. Rill

I.        Introduction

II.      Direct Financial Aid and Competition

III.     Indirect Aid Through Relaxing Antitrust

IV.     The Call For Expanded Antitrust Initiatives

V.      Conclusion

 

Chapter 9

European State Aid Law in the Financial and Economic Crisis -- Has the Commission Risen to the Challenge? 

by Ulrich Soltész and Christian von Köckritz

I.        Introduction

II.      Overview of the General State Aid Framework

          A.      The Rationale for Effective State Aid Policy
          B.      The EC State Aid Law Regime

III.     The Commission's Response to The Financial Crisis

          A.      The Financial Crisis: A Serious Challenge to EC State Aid Law?
          B.      The Commission's Response: Art. 87 (3) b) EC
          C.      After The Restructuring Communication -- Has The Commission Found the Right Approach for Applying Art. 87 (3) (b) EC in the Financial Sector?

IV.      A Side Note: State Aid Control and the "Real Economy" In Times of Crisis

          A.      The "Temporary Framework" -- Background
          B.      Basic Principles
          C.      Instruments under the Temporary Framework
          D.      Procedural Issues
          E.      The Temporary Framework -- the right response to the crisis in the real economy?

V.      Conclusion

 

Chapter 10

Government Aid and Competition Conditions 

by Bernard Spitz

I.        The Situation of The French Insurance Industry Regarding State Aids

II.      The Position of the Insurance Industry Vis-À-Vis State Aids Granted within the Current Financial Crisis

III.     Unlike The Banks, The Insurance Industry Received Almost No State Aids in the Current Financial Crisis, Due to a Fundamental Difference in Nature

IV.     The Threats of State Aids on Fair Competition in the Insurance Field

V.      The Monitoring of State Aids by the EU Commission In Response to the Fears of the Non-Aided Companies

VI.     Monitoring Restructuring Aids as Part of Economic Regulation



Chapter 11

State Aids and EU Competition Law and Policy 
 
Frédéric Jenny, Presider

Seth Bloom

Alberto Heimler

Philip Lowe

Susan Bright

James F. Rill

Ulrich Soltesz

Bernard Spitz

 
Panel Discussion

 

Chapter 12

Does Generic Entry Always Increase Consumer Welfare? 

by Henry Grabowski, Tracy Lewis, Rahul Guha, Zoya Ivanova, Maria Salgado and Sally Woodhouse

I.        Introduction

II.      Benefits and Costs of Branded and Generic Drugs

III.     The Effects of Generic Entry on Competition and Consumer Welfare

          A.      The Nature of Competition In Pharmaceutical Markets
          B.      The Effect of Generic Entry on Brand Competition
          C.      The Effect of Generic Entry on Prices
          D.      The Effect of Generic Entry on Consumer Welfare

IV.     Implications For The Analysis Of Generic Competition In Other Markets

          A.      Implications For The European Union (EU)
          B.      Implications For Biologics

V.      Conclusion

 

Chapter 13

Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals: Firm Responses and Competition Policy 

by Margaret K. Kyle

I.        Introduction

II.      Legal Status of Parallel Trade

          A.      Parallel Trade in the European Union
          B.      Parallel Trade in the United States
          C.      Parallel Trade in Other Major Markets

III.     Economic Models of Parallel Trade

IV.     Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Parallel Trade

          A.      The EU Experience in Pharmaceuticals
          B.      Empirical Evidence in Other Contexts

V.      Parallel Trade and Competition Policy

          A.      Competition Law in the European Union
          B.      Competition Law in the United States

IV.     Conclusion

 

Chapter 14

Patent Settlements and Authorized Generics -- Legal and Practical Issues 

by Caroline B. Manogue

I.        Patent Settlements

II.      Authorized Generics



Chapter 15

Pricing in the Pharmaceutical Industry in Spain: An Overview of Regulatory Developments and its Implications Under Competition Law 

by Edurne Navarro Varona and Luis Moscoso del Prado

I.        Introduction

II.      The Facts of the Case and the Commission Decision

III.     The CFI Ruling

IV.     The Advocate General's Opinion

V.      The Ruling of the European Court of Justice

VI.     Some Comments on the Glaxo Saga

          A.      Definition of Restrictions By Object and Application to the Specific Case

          B.      The Distinction Between Restrictions By Object and By Effects

VII.   The Spanish Cases

VIII.  Conclusion

 

Chapter 16

The Intersection Between EU Competition Law, the Free Movement of Goods and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Some Observations on the Role of Intent 

by Anne Nielsen

I.        Parallel Trade and Pharmaceutical Products

II.      The Early Cases Before The ECJ:  Deciding Whether The Competition or Free Movement Rules Applied

III.     Accession of New Member States

IV.     Increased Scrutiny Under The Competition Rules

V.      Allegations of Abuse of a Dominant Position

VI.     Astrazeneca

VII.   From Parallel Trade in the Article 81 and 82 EC Contexts to the AZ Case to the Sector Inquiry

VIII.  The European Commission Sector Inquiry

IX.     Concluding Remarks

 

Chapter 17

The Application of European Competition Law to the Pharmaceutical Sector -- Some Personal Thoughts 

by Dr. Dominik Schnichels

I.        Introduction

          A.      The Commission Inquiry into the Pharmaceutical Sector
          B.      Main Market Features and Trends
          C.      Past Enforcement Practice
          D.      Scope and Structure of the Article

II.      Application of Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector

          A.      Relationship of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) and Competition Law
          B.      Market Definition
          C.      Patent Settlements
          D.      Parallel Trade

III.     Conclusions

 

Chapter 18

Pharmaceutical Industry and Competition Law 

Luc Gyselen, Presider

William E. Kovacic

Margaret K. Kyle

Tracy R. Lewis

Caroline B. Manogue

Anne N. Nielsen

Dominik Schnichels


Panel Discussion
 


Chapter 19

Resale Price Maintenance: Explaining the Controversy, and Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy 

by Matthew Bennett, Amelia Fletcher, Emanuele Giovannetti and David Stallibrass

I.        Introduction and Conclusions

II.      Legal and Economic Background: The Root of Disagreement

          A.      Creating legal certainty around the law on agreements
          B.      Comparison with Article 82
          C.      Implications for RPM

III.     Introduction to the Economics of RPM

          A.      Efficiency benefits of RPM
          B.      Anticompetitive effects of RPM
          C.      The dreaded question: How often is RPM likely to be on balance harmful?

IV.     Small Steps Towards a More Nuanced Policy?

          A.      Ensuring that the presumption of illegality is truly rebuttable
          B.      The use of screens for prioritising RPM cases
          C.      The use of screens within a legal standard

V.      Conclusions

 

Chapter 20

Resale Price Maintenance in the EU: In Statu Quo Ante Bellum?

by Eric Gippini-Fournier

I.        Introduction

II.      Resale Price Maintenance: The Pain And The Gain

          A.      Some Reasons Why RPM is a Cause for Concern
          B.      Procompetitive claims with regard to RPM

III.     RPM In The EU: Plus Ça Change, Plus C'est La Même Chose?

          A.      The importance of the procedural setup
          B.      The nature of the rule against RPM in the Verticals BER

IV.     Concluding Thoughts

 

Chapter 21

The Leegin Opportunity: A Reasonable Minimum Resale Price Maintenance Enforcement Policy in the United States 

by Tommy Prud'homme

I.        Background

          A.      Dr. Miles
          B.      Colgate
          C.      Beech Nut and Parke Davis
          D.      Sylvania
          E.      Monsanto
          F.       Business Electronics
          G.      Kahn
          H.     Leegin

II.      Defining "Agreement":  Leegin Cut the Legs from under Colgate, Monsanto and Business Electronics

III.     The Structured Rule of Reason

IV.     Conclusion

 

Chapter 22

Resale Price Maintenance and Article 81 EC: Developing a More Sensible Analytical Approach 

by Andreas P. Reindl

I.        Introduction

II.      The Economics-Based Framework for Article 81 Analysis

          A.      A Determination That an Agreement "Restricts Competition" Must Include an Explanation of How the Agreement Increases Market Power, Regardless of                    Whether the Analysis Focuses on a "Restriction by Object" or "Restriction by Effect" Analysis
          B.      Both the "Object" Analysis and the "Effect" Analysis in Article 81(1) Are Evidence Based, Although the Former Relies More on Empirical Evidence, Judicial                    Experience and Consistent Economic Theory on the Effects of a Specific Restraint to Support a General Rule That the Restraint "Restricts Competition," the                    Latter on a Fuller Analysis of the Facts of a Specific Case
          C.      Although "Restriction by Object" and "Restriction by Effect" Indicate Two Different Analytical Routes Imposing Different Evidentiary Requirements on Plaintiffs,                    There Are No Radical Differences Between Them That Separate The Two Into One "Easy/Clear Cut/Legal Certainty" Route and Another                    "Difficult/Messy/Unpredictable" Route
          D.      The Fact That Europe Does Not Do a "Rule of Reason" Analysis Is Not an Argument Against an Analytical Approach Focusing on The Concept of Market                             Power

III.     Identifying Steps Towards an Improved Framework for RPM Analysis Under Article 81

          A.      The Economics of RPM
          B.      The Commission's Current & Proposed Rules Concerning RPM
          C.      Principles for an Improved Article 81 Analysis of RPM
          D.      Competition Authority Prioritization as Alternative

IV.     Conclusions

 

Chapter 23

Assessing the Reasonableness of the Rule of Reason: The World After Leegin

by Christine Wilson, Bimal Patel and Katrina Robson

I.        Introduction

II.      How Did We Get Here?

          A.      Dr. Miles
          B.      A Gradual Paradigm Shift
          C.      Congress Weighs In -- Part One
          D.      A New Day Arrives -- Leegin

III.     Where We Are

          A.      Trends and Key Issues in Lower Courts and at the Agencies Post-Leegin
          B.      Stepping into the Shoes of Plaintiffs

IV.     Where Are We Going?

          A.      The Spectrum of Possible Standards
          B.      A Rising Tide of State Opposition
          C.      Congress Weighs In -- The Encore
          D.      Finding a Solution

 

Chapter 24

Vertical Restraints, RPM and Article 81 Analysis 
 
Andreas Reindl, Presider

Ameilia Fletcher

Eric Gippini Fournier

Edurne Navarro Varona

Damien Neven

Tommy Prud'homme

Nils Wahl

Christine Wilson

 
Panel Discussion