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Cartel Enforcement: International and Canadian Developments - Chapter 5 - International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2004
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International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2004 - Hardcover International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2004 - PDF ____________________________________________________________________________________ Preview Page Chapter 5
CARTEL ENFORCEMENT: INTERNATIONAL
AND CANADIAN DEVELOPMENTS
Sheridan Scott†
I. INTRODUCTION
Hard core cartel activity, such as price fixing and market allocation, is
almost universally recognized as among the most harmful forms of
anticompetitive conduct. Even Robert Bork, considered by many to be
among the most conservative antitrust commentators, has argued that:
The subject of cartels lies at the center of anti-trust policy. The
law’s oldest and, properly qualified, most valuable rule states it
is illegal per se for competitors to agree to limit rivalry among
themselves….Its contributions to consumer welfare over the
decades have been enormous.1
It is difficult, if not impossible, to precisely quantify the magnitude of
the cartel problem in terms of global commerce affected or the harm
caused.2 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) suggests that cartels have imposed billions of United States
(“US”) dollars in overcharges and other harm.3 However, there is clearly a
consensus that the effects are significant enough to warrant action. Sinn
writes that restricting cartels is necessary because the cartel reduces the
quantity it sells and raises prices and on balance cartel gains are less than
About the Editor:
Barry Hawk, Director, Fordham Corporate Law Institute; Professor of Law, Fordham University and Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom (New York and Brussels)
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