Originally from:
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 - Hardcover
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2012 - Electronic
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I. INTRODUCTION
For almost two decades, criminal anti-cartel enforcement has been a
top priority of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The Division’s cartel enforcement policies have been characterized by
continuity across three presidential administrations and a series of
leadership changes within the Division itself. Although “change” has been
a mantra during the current Administration, over the past few years the
Antitrust Division has continued to build on its long track record of
consistent and aggressive criminal enforcement.
The success and expansion of U.S. anti-cartel enforcement rest on two
distinct but related foundations. First, the dramatic and ongoing success
of the enforcement program can be attributed, in significant part, to the
Antitrust Division’s leniency programs. Second, the expansion of cartel
enforcement has been driven by the globalization of many economic
markets. As the economic effects of global competition—and collusion—
have encountered the global reach of enforcement authorities, cartel
enforcement has become a global phenomenon. The results have been
impressive.
From today’s perspective, it is fair to say that the Antitrust Division’s
consistent, aggressive and generally well-articulated enforcement policies
have played a major role in forging an international consensus that anticartel
enforcement—whether criminal or administrative—lies at the core of
sound competition policy. Around the world, cartel enforcement programs
have proliferated. Indeed, enforcement agencies on several continents
now routinely trumpet statistics on case filings, fines and the like.
Moreover, criminal sanctions imposed on individuals are more common
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